Files
odoo_source/addons/payment_ogone/controllers/main.py
T
Antoine Vandevenne (anv) f4ca7290ac [IMP] payment(_*): search only once for the transaction
Before this commit, most acquirers needed to run several successive
searches for the transaction whose reference was received by a
controller in notification data. This is because the security checks
run on the notification data require access to the acquirer through the
transaction record which was immediately discarded.

Starting with this commit, all `*_feedback_data` method are no longer
decorated with `api.model` and can use the transaction record they're
called on if provided. They are also renamed to `*_notification_data`.

task-2737144

closes odoo/odoo#83850

Related: odoo/enterprise#23938
Signed-off-by: Antoine Vandevenne (anv) <anv@odoo.com>
2022-02-02 19:50:49 +00:00

93 lines
4.0 KiB
Python

# Part of Odoo. See LICENSE file for full copyright and licensing details.
import hmac
import logging
import pprint
import re
from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
from odoo import http
from odoo.http import request
_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class OgoneController(http.Controller):
_return_url = '/payment/ogone/return'
_backward_compatibility_urls = [
'/payment/ogone/accept', '/payment/ogone/test/accept',
'/payment/ogone/decline', '/payment/ogone/test/decline',
'/payment/ogone/exception', '/payment/ogone/test/exception',
'/payment/ogone/cancel', '/payment/ogone/test/cancel',
'/payment/ogone/validate/accept',
'/payment/ogone/validate/decline',
'/payment/ogone/validate/exception',
] # Facilitates the migration of users who registered the URLs in Ogone's backend prior to 14.3
@http.route(
[_return_url] + _backward_compatibility_urls, type='http', auth='public',
methods=['GET', 'POST'], csrf=False
) # Redirect are made with GET requests only. Webhook notifications can be set to GET or POST.
def ogone_return_from_checkout(self, **raw_data):
""" Process the notification data sent by Ogone after redirection from checkout.
This route can also accept S2S notifications from Ogone if it is configured as a webhook in
Ogone's backend. The user can choose between GET or POST for the webhook notifications.
:param dict raw_data: The un-formatted notification data
"""
_logger.info("handling redirection from Ogone with data:\n%s", pprint.pformat(raw_data))
data = self._normalize_data_keys(raw_data)
# Check the integrity of the notification
received_signature = data.get('SHASIGN')
tx_sudo = request.env['payment.transaction'].sudo()._get_tx_from_notification_data(
'ogone', data
)
self._verify_notification_signature(raw_data, received_signature, tx_sudo)
# Handle the notification data
tx_sudo._handle_notification_data('ogone', data)
return request.redirect('/payment/status')
@staticmethod
def _normalize_data_keys(data):
""" Set all keys of a dictionary to upper-case.
The keys received from Ogone APIs have inconsistent formatting and must be homogenized to
allow re-using the same methods. We reformat them to follow a unified nomenclature inspired
by Ogone Directlink API.
Formatting steps:
1) Uppercase key strings: 'Something' -> 'SOMETHING', 'something' -> 'SOMETHING'
2) Remove the prefix: 'CARD.SOMETHING' -> 'SOMETHING', 'ALIAS.SOMETHING' -> 'SOMETHING'
:param dict data: The data whose keys to normalize
:return: The normalized data
:rtype: dict
"""
return {re.sub(r'.*\.', '', k.upper()): v for k, v in data.items()}
@staticmethod
def _verify_notification_signature(notification_data, received_signature, tx_sudo):
""" Check that the received signature matches the expected one.
:param dict notification_data: The notification data
:param str received_signature: The signature received with the notification data
:param recordset tx_sudo: The sudoed transaction referenced by the notification data, as a
`payment.transaction` record
:return: None
:raise: :class:`werkzeug.exceptions.Forbidden` if the signatures don't match
"""
# Check for the received signature
if not received_signature:
_logger.warning("received notification with missing signature")
raise Forbidden()
# Compare the received signature with the expected signature computed from the data
expected_signature = tx_sudo.acquirer_id._ogone_generate_signature(notification_data)
if not hmac.compare_digest(received_signature, expected_signature.upper()):
_logger.warning("received notification with invalid signature")
raise Forbidden()