Before this commit, most acquirers needed to run several successive searches for the transaction whose reference was received by a controller in notification data. This is because the security checks run on the notification data require access to the acquirer through the transaction record which was immediately discarded. Starting with this commit, all `*_feedback_data` method are no longer decorated with `api.model` and can use the transaction record they're called on if provided. They are also renamed to `*_notification_data`. task-2737144 closes odoo/odoo#83850 Related: odoo/enterprise#23938 Signed-off-by: Antoine Vandevenne (anv) <anv@odoo.com>
93 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
93 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
# Part of Odoo. See LICENSE file for full copyright and licensing details.
|
|
|
|
import hmac
|
|
import logging
|
|
import pprint
|
|
import re
|
|
|
|
from werkzeug.exceptions import Forbidden
|
|
|
|
from odoo import http
|
|
from odoo.http import request
|
|
|
|
_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class OgoneController(http.Controller):
|
|
_return_url = '/payment/ogone/return'
|
|
_backward_compatibility_urls = [
|
|
'/payment/ogone/accept', '/payment/ogone/test/accept',
|
|
'/payment/ogone/decline', '/payment/ogone/test/decline',
|
|
'/payment/ogone/exception', '/payment/ogone/test/exception',
|
|
'/payment/ogone/cancel', '/payment/ogone/test/cancel',
|
|
'/payment/ogone/validate/accept',
|
|
'/payment/ogone/validate/decline',
|
|
'/payment/ogone/validate/exception',
|
|
] # Facilitates the migration of users who registered the URLs in Ogone's backend prior to 14.3
|
|
|
|
@http.route(
|
|
[_return_url] + _backward_compatibility_urls, type='http', auth='public',
|
|
methods=['GET', 'POST'], csrf=False
|
|
) # Redirect are made with GET requests only. Webhook notifications can be set to GET or POST.
|
|
def ogone_return_from_checkout(self, **raw_data):
|
|
""" Process the notification data sent by Ogone after redirection from checkout.
|
|
|
|
This route can also accept S2S notifications from Ogone if it is configured as a webhook in
|
|
Ogone's backend. The user can choose between GET or POST for the webhook notifications.
|
|
|
|
:param dict raw_data: The un-formatted notification data
|
|
"""
|
|
_logger.info("handling redirection from Ogone with data:\n%s", pprint.pformat(raw_data))
|
|
data = self._normalize_data_keys(raw_data)
|
|
|
|
# Check the integrity of the notification
|
|
received_signature = data.get('SHASIGN')
|
|
tx_sudo = request.env['payment.transaction'].sudo()._get_tx_from_notification_data(
|
|
'ogone', data
|
|
)
|
|
self._verify_notification_signature(raw_data, received_signature, tx_sudo)
|
|
|
|
# Handle the notification data
|
|
tx_sudo._handle_notification_data('ogone', data)
|
|
return request.redirect('/payment/status')
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def _normalize_data_keys(data):
|
|
""" Set all keys of a dictionary to upper-case.
|
|
|
|
The keys received from Ogone APIs have inconsistent formatting and must be homogenized to
|
|
allow re-using the same methods. We reformat them to follow a unified nomenclature inspired
|
|
by Ogone Directlink API.
|
|
|
|
Formatting steps:
|
|
1) Uppercase key strings: 'Something' -> 'SOMETHING', 'something' -> 'SOMETHING'
|
|
2) Remove the prefix: 'CARD.SOMETHING' -> 'SOMETHING', 'ALIAS.SOMETHING' -> 'SOMETHING'
|
|
|
|
:param dict data: The data whose keys to normalize
|
|
:return: The normalized data
|
|
:rtype: dict
|
|
"""
|
|
return {re.sub(r'.*\.', '', k.upper()): v for k, v in data.items()}
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def _verify_notification_signature(notification_data, received_signature, tx_sudo):
|
|
""" Check that the received signature matches the expected one.
|
|
|
|
:param dict notification_data: The notification data
|
|
:param str received_signature: The signature received with the notification data
|
|
:param recordset tx_sudo: The sudoed transaction referenced by the notification data, as a
|
|
`payment.transaction` record
|
|
:return: None
|
|
:raise: :class:`werkzeug.exceptions.Forbidden` if the signatures don't match
|
|
"""
|
|
# Check for the received signature
|
|
if not received_signature:
|
|
_logger.warning("received notification with missing signature")
|
|
raise Forbidden()
|
|
|
|
# Compare the received signature with the expected signature computed from the data
|
|
expected_signature = tx_sudo.acquirer_id._ogone_generate_signature(notification_data)
|
|
if not hmac.compare_digest(received_signature, expected_signature.upper()):
|
|
_logger.warning("received notification with invalid signature")
|
|
raise Forbidden()
|