Before this commit the neutralize system introduced in v16 was using ORM
methods in order to change appropriate records. Although flexible, this approach
could lead to call some methods with side effects while neutralizing
(eg: overloads of write).
This patch converts the neutralize system to a safer "inert" SQL based approach
by migrating the generic method _neutralize to SQL files exposed in the
data folder.
Task id: 2961687closesodoo/odoo#102792
X-original-commit: e5dbded9bb363351feff7ca8a56c7f8a6860f492
Related: odoo/enterprise#32580
Signed-off-by: Fabien Meghazi <fme@odoo.com>
Changing the name of model payment.acquirer to payment.provider
and everything that it touches. It is technically incorrect to
use the term "acquirer" for systems that only provide a service
of payment.
After this commit the model payment.acquirer and all related to
it will be renamed to payment.provider.
Task - 2842088
closesodoo/odoo#90899
Related: odoo/upgrade#3542
Related: odoo/documentation#1981
Related: odoo/enterprise#27131
Signed-off-by: Victor Feyens (vfe) <vfe@odoo.com>
This commit adds the possibility to define a maximum payment amount that
a given acquirer can process. If the payment amount exceeds the value,
the acquirer is filtered out of the available acquirers listed on the
payment forms.
While we're at it, the field `country_ids` is renamed to
`available_country_ids` to better depict that it is not a property of
the acquirer, but a configuration option. It will also be coherent with
the field `available_currency_ids` that is expected to be added soon.
Task - 2162165
closesodoo/odoo#82411
Related: odoo/enterprise#24412
Related: odoo/upgrade#3703
Signed-off-by: Antoine Vandevenne (anv) <anv@odoo.com>
An overridable model method was added in a previous commit in order to
neutralize a database.
This commit introduce the implementation of this method for the payment
modules.
Also, a `_neutralize_fields` helper method is added on the
PaymentAcquirer model to simplify the neutralization of the various
payment modules.
Part-of: odoo/odoo#67825
Notification handling in some acquirers presents a subset of the
following issues:
1. The signature of synchronous notifications (redirect payloads) is not
checked. (Alipay, Authorize, Buckaroo, Mollie, PayU money, PayULatam)
2. When the signature check fails, we raise a ValidationError which
counts as an HTTP 200 for some providers (it's not the case if they
expect a specific string). (Adyen, Paypal, Sips, Stripe)
3. If a ValidationError is raised when processing the feedback data, it
is allowed to bubble up to the provider. (Alipay, Ogone)
The issues are respectively addressed as follows:
1. If the acquirer implements payments with redirection, make sure that
if either makes a request to the provider to validate the data or
that it verifies the signature. Verifying the origin of the request
is not enough: the payload must be checked too.
2. Instead of raising ValidationError's, raise an HTTP 403 FORBIDDEN
error if the signature check fails.
3. Wrap the call to `_handle_feedback_data` of the webhook method inside
a try/except clause to catch any ValidationError, log a warning, and
acknowledge the notification to avoid having the provider disable the
webhook because of too many failures.
task-2688139
task-2693293
closesodoo/odoo#81607
Signed-off-by: Antoine Vandevenne (anv) <anv@odoo.com>
Co-authored-by: Lucie Van Nieuwenhuyze <luvn@odoo.com>
Laurent Desausoi